Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1981

Weldon S. Abbott v. Newell Christensen and
Newell Christensen v. Weldon S. Abbott : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errorsGeorge E. Mangan; Attorneys for RespondentWallace D. Hurd;
Attorney for Appellant
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Abbott v. Christensen, No. 17616 (Utah Supreme Court, 1981).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/2592

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

-IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

WELDON S. ABBOTT,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

vs.
NEWELL CHRISTENSEN,
Defendant-Respondent,
Case No. 17616
NEWELL CHRISTENSEN,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

vs.
WELDON S. ABBOTT,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT OF THE
DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY
HONORABLE J. ROBERT BULLOCK

WALLACE D. HURD
9 Exchange Place, Suite 520
Salt Lake City, Utah 14111
Telephone: (801) 355-1341
Attorney for Appellant
MANGAN & GILLESPIE, APC
George E. Mangan
P.O. Box 246
Roosevelt, Utah 84066
Attorneys for Respondent

FILED
NOV 13 1981

-----····-··---. ----------------s.- c:-t.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Utah
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors. CLW.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

WELDON S. ABBOTT,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

vs.
NEWELL CHRISTENSEN,
Defendant-Respondent,
Case No. 17616
NEWELL CHRISTENSEN,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

vs.
WELDON S. ABBOTT,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT OF THE
DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY
HONORABLE J. ROBERT BULLOCK

WALLACE D. HURD
9 Exchange Place, Suite 520
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: C80ll 355-1341
Attorney for Appellant
MANGAN & GILLESPIE, APC
George E. Mangan
P.O. Box 246
Roosevelt, Utah 84066
Attorneys for Respondent

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

NATURE OF THE CASE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3

STATEMENT OF FACTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4

ARGUMENT..................................................

9

I.

IN AN EQUITY CASE, THE APPEAL MAY BE ON QUESTIONS OF BOTH LAW AND FACT. THE PROCEEDINGS IN
THE TRIAL COURT WERE BASED UPON AN ACCOUNTING
BETWEEN JOINT VENTURERS WHICH IS AN EQUITABLE
ACTION............................................

9

II.

THE REPORTS OF THE SPECIAL MASTER DID NOT CONFORM
TO THE STIPULATION OF THE PARTIES IN THAT THEY
FAILED TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE VALUES OF THE REAL
ESTATE IN QUESTION, THE DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE
UPON TERMINATION OF THE VENTURE, AND THE MONETARY
AND OTHER VALUABLE CONTRIBUTIONS MADE BY THE RESPECTIVE PARTIES .........•........•............... 10

III.

THE ZANE CHRISTENSEN RANCH PROPERTY WAS PURCHASED
DURING THE PERIOD IN WHICH THE PARTIES WERE OPERATING THEIR JOINT VENTURE. ABBOTT SHOULD RECEIVE
CREDIT IN THE JOINT VENTURE ACCOUNTING FOR MAKING
THE DOWN PAYMENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . • . . . . . . . . 14

IV.

THE TESTIMONY OF THE PARTIES SUPPORTS ABBOTT'S
CONTENTION THAT THE ONLY PROFITS TO BE SHARED
WERE FROM THE SALE OF CALVES ...•...........•...... 18

V.

THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE FINDINGS OF
FACT THAT ALL LOSSES FROM THE OPERATION WERE TO
BE ABBOTT'S . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

VI.

THE COWS REPLEVIED BY ABBOTT ARE ATTRIBUTABLE TO
HIS CAPITAL CONTRIBUTION AND RIGHTFULLY BELONGED
TO ABBOTT UNDER THE AGREEMENT TERMINATING THE
JOINT VENTURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

VII.

THE AWARD TO CHRISTENSEN FOR CARE OF ABBOTT'S
COWS WAS IN CONTRAVENTION OF THE PARTIES
AGREEMENT......................................... 26
i

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

VIII. ALTERNATIVELY, THE AWARD TO CHRISTENSEN FOR CARE
OF ABBOTT'S COWS WAS EXCESSIVE AND UNJUSTIFIED .... 27
IX. UNDER UTAH LAW, CHRISTENSEN IS NOT ENTITLED TO
THE 424 SHARES OF FARNSWORTH CANAL IRRIGATION
COMPANY STOCK .•..••..•....•...•.......•........... JO
CONCLUSION ••.......•....•......•....••..•...•..•.......... 37

ii

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
cases Cited

Page

Brimm v. Cache Valley Banking Co., 2 U.2d 93,
269 P.2d 859 (1954) ....••.......•...•.............•....•

31,32

child v. Hayward, 16 U.2d 351, 400 P.2d 758
<1965)..................................................

9

consolidated Fisheries Co. v. Consolidated
Soluables Co. (Sup) 35 Del. Ch. 125, 112 A.2d
30, Supp. op. 35 Del. Ch. 178, 113 A.2d 576 (1955) .•...•

13

Hatch v. Adams,

31,32,35

7 U.2d 73, 318 P.2d 633 Cl957l •...••..••••

Olinero v. Eleganti, 61 U. 475, 214 P. 313
(1923) ................•....•••...•••..•••••..•••.•••...•

10

Producers Livestock v. Christensen, 588 P.2d
156 (1978) .....••.•.....••....•••••.....••••...•••...•••

21,22

Ream v. Fitzen, 581 P.2d 145 <1978) ..•••...•••••.•••••....

10,13

Sanders v. McDonough, 191 Ala. 119,
67 So. 591 (1914) .•••••••••••..•.••••.•...••••••••.••.••

13

State Bank of Lehi v. Woolsey, 565 P.2d
413 ( 1977)..............................................

36

Stevens v. Gray, 123 U. 395, 259 P.2d 889
(1953)................................ •• . • • • • • • . . . • . . • • •

9

Tiffany v. Short, 22 Cal.2d 531, 139 P.2d
939 (1943) .••.............••••••••••••••••••••••••••.•••

13

West v. West, 16 U.2d 411, 403 P.2d 22 (1965).............

9

iii

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Other Authorities
60 Am Jur 2d 39 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Constitution of Utah, Articl.e VIII, Section 9 ............ .
Utah Code
Section
Section
Section
Section
Section

Annotated, (1953), as amended
48-1-4(4) . . • . • . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
48-1-15 ( 1). . . . . . . . • . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . .
48-1-37 .•...•••........•......•.....•.......... ,
48-1-37(2) •......•••...•........•...••••••.•....
73-1-10 •••....•.•••....•........•.....•.•.......

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 72(a) ................ .

iv

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

22

21
ll,..
14
Jl

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

WELDON S. ABBOTT,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
NEWELL CHRISTENSEN,
Defendant-Respondent,
Case No. 17616
NEWELL CHRISTENSEN,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
WELDON S. ABBOTT,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

NATURE OF THE CASE
This appeal is from a judgment rendered in a consolidated trial of three separate actions.
were initiated by Weldon

s.

Two of the actions

Abbott, hereinafter referred to

as Abbott, against Newell Christensen, hereinafter referred
to as Christensen.

In the first action, Abbott sought to re-

plevin 28 head of cattle which were retained by Christensen
when a joint venture involving the two parties was termin-
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ated.

The second action by Abbott sought to recover the

5~

of $29, 000. 00, the down payment on a real estate contract entered into between Abbott as seller and Christensen as
buyer.

In the third of the three actions consolidated for

trial, Christensen initiated suit against Abbott seeking t~
reformation of a real estate sales contract, and damages for
breach of contract.
Prior to the trial of the consolidated case, the
parties stipulated to the appointment of a special master by
the court for the purpose of determining the status of accounts between the parties.

Thereafter, both the court and

counsel proceeded on the basis that the action was in the
nature of an accounting between the parties and their joint
operations between Fall 1970 and Spring 1975.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The consolidated case was tried on July 9, 1980, in
the District Court for Duchesne County, before Judge J.
Robert Bullock, without a jury.

Judgment was entered on Feb·

ruary 14, 1981 after the report and supplemental report of
the special master had been filed, oral argument by counsel,
and written memoranda submitted on behalf of both parties.
The judgment required Abbott:
1.
Based on reports of the special master,
to pay $47,663. 79 to Christensen,
2.
To deposit 424 shares of Farnsworth Canal
Irrigation Company stock in an escrow account for
delivery to Christensen; and,
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3.
To quitclaim to Christensen, any interest he
had in properties formerly used in the partnership known as the Birch No. 1 Place, Birch No. 2
Place, and the Lindsay Place.
Said judgment required Christensen:
1.
To quitclaim to Abbott, any interest he had
in properties formerly used in the partnership
known as the Bleazard Place, the Whitehead Place,
and the Taylor Place;
2.
To release his claim to use of a registered
brand formerly used in the partnership; and,
3.
Pay Abbott the $29,000.00 down payment owed
on the Lindsay Place.
In addition, the judgment affirmed Abbott's right to
funds paid into escrow under a real eastate sales contract
between the parties and to possession of a quarter horse
mare and her colt.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a Judgment of this court:
1.

That the reports of the special master did not

conform to the stipulation of the parties and the order of
the trial court appointing him and that the Judgment awarding Christensen $47,663.79, which was based upon the reports
of the special master, be reversed.
2.

That this court remand the case to the trial

court with instructions that the accounting give Abbott
credit for his capital contributions.
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3.

That the Reary Place contract between the par-

ties did not include the 424 shares of Farnsworth Canal Irrigation Company stock and that the decision of the lower
court awarding said stock to Christensen be reversed.
4.

That the decision of the lower court that the

Zane Christensen purchase contract was not part of the joint
operation of the parties be reversed and Abbott be given
credit for the amount of the down payment in the joint venture accounting.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Abbott and Christensen first met in the fall of
1970. There were discussions betweeen the parties regarding
the possibility of Christensen feeding and caring for
that Abbott intended to acquire.

catt~

At the time of the dis-

cussions, Christensen was employed by the Forest Service.
(Tr.

55)
The parties agreed that Christensen would care for

Abbott's cattle.

In compensation, Christensen was to re-

ceive a monthly draw of $500.00 and live in a home on the
Reary Place, a ranch owned by Abbott.

Further, the parties

agreed that Christensen would receive one-half of the net
proceeds from calf sales after deducting expenses of the venture.

(Tr.

55-57)

-4-
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Christensen moved into the home on the Reary Place
in 1971.

He occupied the home as his residence from that

time forward without the payment of rent.

Thereafter, there

were certain real estate purchases made as set forth below.
I Tr.

56)
The first tract of ground purchased was the Reary

property, in January of 1971.

(Tr.

389)

Abbott issued

checks from his personal account for $29,500.00 (Plaintiff's
Exhibits 48,

49, and 50), and signed a note for $14,500.00.

The property was then deeded to Abbott.
35)

<Plaintiff's Exhibit

Included in this purchase was farm equipment,

<Plain-

tiff's Exhibit 36) and 424 shares of Farnsworth Canal
Irrigation Company stock.
The next purchase was made on April 1, 1971 of the
Bleazard Ranch for a total of $165,000.00, payable
$25,000.00 down, $24,000.00 from Abbott's personal account
and $1,0000.00 from the Walker Bank ranch account.
tiff's Exhibits 15, 51 and 52)

(Plain-

In addition, two tracts of

ground belonging to Christensen were traded to Bleazard for
a credit of $35,000.00 on the contract of purchase.
397-399)

<Tr.

Sixty cows were also purchased from Bleazard but

were not included in the sales contract.
for separately.

(Tr.

The cows were paid

397)

The two Birch properties were purchased with funds
from the Ranch Account totalling $19,140.49.

(Plaintiff's
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Exhibits 39,

57-61, 64)

At the time Birch No.

1 was pur-

chased, Abbott gave a personal check for approximately
$11,000.00 for the balance of the down payment.
401, 402, 406)

(Tr.

The Birch estate was in probate and the check

was held for about two years and when presented for payment,
the bank refused to honor it.

(Tr.

At that time,

404)

Christensen borrowed $15,000.00 from Zions Bank, which was
deposited in the Zions Ranch account and from which the
ment was made on the Birch No. 1.

(Tr.

~~

405)

The Taylor property was purchased January 17, 1973
by Abbott entirely from his own funds for the sum of
$16,000.00.

Neither water stock, machinery or cattle were

included in this purchase.

(Tr.

389)

The next purchase was the Lindsay Ranch on June 21,
1973, for a total price of $100, 000. 00.

The $29, 000. 00 down

payment was made from the Walker Bank ranch account. (Tr.
92, Plaintiff's Exhibits 16, 23, and 24)

This contract in-

cluded 149 head of cattle, 65 sheep and farm equipment as
listed in a Bill of Sale.

(Plaintiff's Exhibit 16)

The Whitehead Ranch was purchased for the sum of
$105, 000. 00 on April 2, 1974, with the $26, 000. 00 down pay-

ment being made from the Walker Bank Ranch Account.
tiff's Exhibits 18 and 66)
both cows and machinery.

(Plain-

The Whitehead Ranch included

(Tr.

428-429)
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The last real estate transaction was on June 14,
1974, when ranch property of Zane Christensen was purchased
on contract for $681,000.00.

The $50,000.00 down payment

was made by a $30,000.00 check from the Walker Bank ranch
account and $20,000.00 in checks from the Zions Bank ranch
account.

The contract was in both Christensen's and

Abbott's names.

(Plaintiff's Exhibits 14, 76, 77, 78)

Abbott and Christensen mutually agreed to terminate
their operation in the spring of 1975.

In accordance with

their oral agreement, the parties divided the various tracts
of real property.

To effect the divisions, Abbott, in each

instance, prepared a new contract wherein the individual who
was to receive the subject real property was shown as the
Buyer and the other party was shown as the Seller.

(Tr.

427-428 and Plaintiff's Exhibits 62, 73, 74, and 79)

The

trial Court found these contracts to be fully integrated contracts.

(Record- Civil No.

5800 file, page 83- FF#6l

Regarding the Reary Place and the Lindsay Place, the
contracts from Abbott as Seller to Christensen as Buyer,
were similar to the original purchase contracts.

However,

whereas the original Reary contract specifically included
424 shares of irrigation water and certain personal property
the contract of sale to Christensen did not include these
items.

(Tr.

391-392 and Plaintiff's Exhibit 14l
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In preparing the contract selling the Lindsay Place

~

Christensen, Abbott also excluded the personal property.
The Lindsay Place contract from Abbott to Christensen recited a down payment of $29, 000. 00. Christensen did not pay
the $29, 000. 00.

(Record- Civil No.

5800 file, page 83, FF#91

On November 1, 1974, also as part of the termination
agreement, Abbott entered into a contract to sell the Zane
Christensen Place to Christensen.

(Plaintiff's Exhibit 791

Althought that contract recites a down payment of
$50,000.00, Abbott never received that amount from

Christensen.

(Tr.

436-439)

As part of the termination agreement, Christensen
cared for certain cows which belonged to Abbott.

The cows

were watered and fed by Christensen following termination of
the venture until various dates in 1975.

(Tr.

443-444)

Abbott contends that Christensen did not surrender control
of 60 head of cows which belonged to Abbott under the terms
of the oral termination agreement.

(Tr.

86-90, 101-103)

Prior to the trial, the parties stipulated to the
appointment of a special master.
file, page 65l.

(Record-Civil No. 5799

The stipulation required the special master

to:
audit the documents submitted and determine
as far as possible therefrom the status of accoun~s
between the parties taking into account the relative
values of the real estate in question, as well as
the basis for division of profits from the cattle
operation, and the division of real estate upon
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termination of the venture, and the monetary and
other valuable contributions made by the respective
parties. "
However,

in making his report, the special master, as

instructed by the trial court, disregarded the personal
property which was distributed on termination of the venture
!Tr. 515-519).

Further, that report included income items

which were not part of the agreed upon profit from the "sale
of calves".

(Record-Civil No.

6169 file, page 128).

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
IN AN EQUITY CASE, THE APPEAL MAY BE ON QUESTIONS OF BOTH
LAW AND FACT.
THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE TRIAL COURT WERE BASED
UPON AN ACCOUNTING BETWEEN JOINT VENTURERS WHICH IS AN
EQUITABLE ACTION.
The Utah Constitution states that, "In equity cases
the appeal may be on questions of both law and fact.
Constitution of Utah, Article VIII, Section 9.

This

directive of the people has been codified in Rule 72 (a)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
The law regarding the nature of an accounting between
former members of a joint venture is well settled.

This

Court has recognized that such an action is in equity.
Stevens v. Gray, 123 U.
West v. West,

395, 398, 259 P.2d 889 (1953),

16 u. 2d 411,

413,

403 P. 2d 22 ( 1965).

In Child v. Hayward, 16 U.2d 351, 352, 400 P.2d

758 11965), this court announced the standard it would
use in reviewing the facts:
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. . it is our duty to review the evidence
and all reasonable inferences fairly to be
drawn therefrom in the light most favorable
to the findings and judgment."
Further, in reviewing equity cases:
" . . . the findings of the trial courts on
conflicting evidence will not be set aside
unless it manifestly appears that the Court
misapplied proven facts or made findings
clearly against the weight of evidence."
Olinero v. Elganti, 61 u. 475, 479,
214 P. 313 (1923), Ream v. Fitzen,
581 P. 2d 145, 147 ( 1978).
The appellant asserts that, in applying these
standards, this Court will find that the evidence adduced
at trial will not support the findings presented by the
special master and adopted by the trial court.
Civil No.
FF#2l

(Record-

5800 file, p. 82 FF#l and p. 127 Supplement

Nor does the evidence support the trial court's

Findings of Fact numbers 2, 7, and 8 and Conclusions of
Law numbers 1 and 6.

(Record-Civil No.

5800 file, pp.82-

84)

POINT II.

THE REPORTS OF THE SPECIAL MASTER DID NOT CONFORM TO THE
STIPULATION OF THE PARTIES IN THAT THEY FAILED TO TAKE INTO
ACCOUNT THE VALUES OF THE REAL ESTATE IN QUESTION, THE DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE UPON TERMINATION OF THE VENTURE, AND THE
MONETARY AND OTHER VALUABLE CONTRIBUTIONS MADE BY THE RESPECTIVE PARTIES.
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After consolidation of the cases and prior to trial,
Abbott and Christensen stipulated to the appointment of a
special master.

Under the terms of the stipulation, the

special master was:
. . to receive and review the documentary evidence
from the respective parties which evidence shall
include all bills, receipts, checks, deposit slips,
contracts of sale, bills of sale, prior accountings,
tax returns and any other records - - - covering
the joint operations . . . between the fall of 1970
and the spring of 1975."
(Record- Civil No. 5799
file, p.65)
Upon completion of his audit of the documents subrnitted, the special master was to:
. . determine as far as possible therefrom the
status of accounts between the parties taking
into account the relative values of real estate
in question as well as the basis for division
of profits from the cattle operation, and of
the venture, and the monetary and other valuable
contributions made by the respective parties."
(Record- Civil No. 5799 file, p. 65).
After receiving documents from the parties, holding
a hearing to discuss various matters, and attending court
sessions, the special master produced four reports.

One

dated August 21, 1979, is in the envelope with the
exhibits, although not so marked.
in the record on appeal as follows:
8, 1980 is in civil No.

The others are located
Report dated October

6169 file, p.128-130; report

dated February 26, 1980 is located in Civil No.
file, p.

5799

72; and report dated February 18, 1981 is
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attached to Supplement to Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in Civil No.

5800 file, p. 127-128).

According to the reports, the special master considered the following items in his accounting:
1.

Income from the sale of calves, sheep, lambs,
beef, and fill dirt;

2.

Operating expenses paid to Christensen and
others;

3.

Wages earned by and paid to Christensen;

4.

Overdraft in the Zion's First National Bank
ranch account and overdraft charges on that
account;

5.

Contributions to the joint venture working
capital made by Christensen and certain of his
personal expenses;

6.

Credits to Christensen for the care of Abbott's
cattle after the termination of the joint
venture;

7.

Credits to Christensen for cattle and calves
replevied by Abbott; and,

8.

Credit to Abbott for the down payment due from
Christensen on the Lindsay Place contract of
sale.

Upon the completion of trial, the special master was
directed by the Court to determine the operating capital
of the joint venture.

In that determination, he was to

disregard Abbott's cost of money [interest expense] to
acquire the land and cattle (Tr.

515) and to disregard

Abbott's investment in land and cattle.

(Tr.

516)
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distribution of profits owing to partners, Section 48-1-37
12), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.
Christensen argued that the distribution of joint
venture real property was separate from any capital contribution and division of joint venture calves. (Tr. 106>
However,

inasmuch as the real property constituted part

of Abbott's capital contribution (Tr.

56, 65), it is un-

conscionable to give Christensen credit for his capital
contributions and not give Abbott credit for his capital
contributions.
Appellant requests this court to hold that the
accounting made by the special master was incomplete in
that it did not recognize appellant's capital contributions to the joint venture.

Further, that the matter be

remanded to the lower court with instructions to take
appellant's capital contributions into account and
recalculate the accounts of the parties in accordance
with the rules of distribution in Section 48-1-37, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.
POINT III.
THE ZANE CHRISTENSEN RANCH PROPERTY WAS PURCHASED DURING THE
PERIOD IN WHICH THE PARTIES WERE OPERATING THEIR JOINT VENTURE. ABBOTT SHOULD RECEIVE CREDIT IN THE JOINT VENTURE
ACCOUNTING FOR MAKING THE DOWN PAYMENT.
In June of 1977, Abbott and Christensen entered into
a contract,

<Plaintiff's Exhibit #19> to purchase proper-
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Abbott submits that the Court erred in placing these
restrictions upon the special master.

In support of this

contention, we invite attention to the stipulation of the
parties wherein the accounting was to include,

"the divi-

sion of real estate upon termination" and "the monetary
and other valuable contributions made by the respective
parties." Id.

Failure to include Abbott's capital con-

tributions while including Christensen's has lead to an
inequitable result.
Abbott urges further that as a " . . . general rule
applicable to dissolution in the case of a joint venture
. in the absence of an express agreement to the contrary, the person advancing capital is entitled to its
return before there is a division of income or profits."
46 Am Jur 2d 56, citing Saunders v. McDonough, 191 Ala.
119, 67 So.

591 ( 1914): Tiffany v. Short, 22 Cal 2d

531, 139 P.2d 939 (1943l; Consolidated Fisheries Co. vs.
Consolidated Soluables Co.

<Supl 35 Del. Ch. 125, 112

A.2d 30, Supp. op. 35 Del. Ch. 178, 113 A.2d 576 (1955).
This court has held that distribution in joint venture
cases is governed by the Uniform Partnership Act. See
v. Fitzen, at 148.

~

Under Section 48-1-37, Utah Code Annot~

ted, 1953, as amended, capital contributions of partners are
recognized as liabilities of the partnership.

As such, in

distribution of partnership assets, they rank ahead of the
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ty known as the Peterson Place from Zane T. Christensen
and Flora Christensen.

The contract called for a down

Oayment of $200,00.00.

Of that amount, $50,000.00 was

receipted for in the contract.

Both Abbott and Christen-

sen signed the contract.
The $50,000.00 down payment was made in the form of
three checks.

Check one was written in favor of Zane

Christensen in the amount of $30,000.00, dated 6-18-74,
signed by Abbott and drawn on the joint venture's Walker
Bank ranch account.

(Plaintiff's Exhibit 76 and Tr. 434l

Check two was written in favor of Zane Christensen in the
amount of $15,000.00, dated 6-18-74, signed by Abbott and
drawn on the joint venture's ranch account at Zion's
First National Bank in Roosevelt.
and Tr. 434)

(Plaintiff's Exhibit 77

Check three was written in favor of Zane

Christensen in the amount of $5,000.00, dated June 1974,
signed by Newell Christensen, the respondent, and drawn
on the joint venture's Zion's First National Bank ranch
account in Roosevelt.

(Plaintiff's Exhibit 78 and Tr.

434)
According to Christensen's own testimony, the Peterson Place,

(also referred to at various places in the

trial record as the Zane Christensen property), was operated as part of the joint venture.

"Q.

Have you ever operated the land known
as the Peterson Place that you bought
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from Zane Christensen?
"A.

Yes.

We run it in 1974."

(Tr.

308)

As testified to by Abbott and undisputed by
Christensen, the $50,000.00 down payment on the Peterson
Place was made wholly from funds supplied by Abbott. (Tr.
439)

Yet, in accordance with the Court's directions, the

special master ignored Abbott's capital contribution
toward the
report.

Pet~rson

(Tr.

Place down payment when preparing his

516, 517)

In accordance with the oral termination agreement,
Abbott prepared a contract of sale dated November 1, 1974
describing the Zane Christensen property from himself as
seller to Newell Christensen as buyer.

(Plaintiff's Ex-

hibit 79)
The signatures of Abbott, his wife, and Christensen
are all affixed to the contract.

The contract recites a

down payment of $200,000.00, consisting of $50,000.00
cash and a $150,000.00 note as in the original contract
between the parties to this action and Zane Christensen.
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 79)
Christensen, however denies ever having agreed to
repay the $50,000.00 cash down payment to Abbott (Tr.
561)

Christensen's other testimony on the subject of the

down payment was contradictory.
already paid $25,000.00.

(Tr.

He testified that he
210-211)

And, he stated
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that he had no funds of his own with which to make the required down payment.

<Tr.

2201

After Abbott and Christensen entered into the contract of sale for the Zane Christensen place [Abbott to
Christensen],

Zane Christensen sent a letter to Abbott

regarding default in payment under the terms of the contract of purchase between the joint venture and Zane
Christensen.

(Plaintiff's Exhibit 201

fied to receiving a similar letter.

Christensen testi-

(Tr.

220>

He fur-

ther testified that Zane Christensen sent a second letter
terminating the contract in February of 1975.

{Tr. 218)

As was argued above, under Point II, to take into
account the capital contributions of Christensen in preparation of the joint venture accounting while disregarding Abbott's capital contributions is unconscionable.

If

this result is allowed to stand, Christensen will be the
benefactor of Abbott's $50,000.00 loss.

First, he re-

ceived property paid for by Abbott upon termination of
the joint venture.

Next, under the special master's

report, he also receives a full return of his own capital
contributions while Abbott's contributions to the joint
venture's capital are completely disregarded.
In order for an equitable result to occur in this
joint venture accounting, Abbott requests that this Court
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remand with instructions to make a full accounting.
With such full accounting to include:

1.
All capital contributions made by the parties
(including Abbott's $50,000.00 down payment on
the Zane
Christensen/Peterson Place);
2.

The profits as agreed upon by the parties;

3.
All expenses of the joint venture; including
interest expense; and,
4.

The distribution of joint venture property made
at its termination.
POINT IV.

THE TESTIMONY OF THE PARTIES SUPPORTS ABBOTT'S CONTENTION
THAT THE ONLY PROFITS TO BE SHARED WERE FROM THE SALE OF
CALVES.
In Finding of Fact #2, the trial Court stated:
"That the agreement under which the parties operated
from 1971 until the end of December,1974, was that
plaintiff was to furnish all land and all cattle and
that defendant was to operate the venture for whicl
he was to receive one-half of any net profits from
the operation after deducting operating expenses.
The defendant was to receive a guarantee of $500 per
month, and any losses from the operation were to ~
plaintiff's." (Record-Civil No. 5800 file, pp. 8283)
The part of the finding relating to profits is in
direct opposition to the testimony of both Christensen
and his wife, Maxine.
On direct examination, Christensen stated his understanding of the joint venture agreement.

In response to

a question regarding the terms of the operation, Christen-

-18Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

sen stated:

"Dr. Abbott was to buy the land and cattle.

I was to be guaranteed $500 a month plus half the calf
cro£

[Emphasis Added]

<Tr.

65)

On cross-

examination, Christensen modified his testimony, stating,
. . when the calf crop was sold, the ranch expense was
to come out of the calf crop and we were to split what
was left." <Tr.

75)

This was reiterated on further cross

examination, Vith the added statement that the agreement
was never changed.

(Tr. 75)

On direct examination, Maxine Christensen, the respondent's wife, answered in the affirmative when asked
whether her testimony would "be in substance" the same as
her husband's regarding the arrangements between Abbott
and Christensen.

(Tr.

339-340)

It is apparent that Christensen's testimony is in
agreement with Abbott's contention and understanding that
only profits from the sale of calves were to be shared.
Abbott's own understanding of the agreement was elicited
on direct examination: " . . . as we got some cows I would
guarantee him [Christensen] a draw of $500 a month
against net profit in the long run.

As we ran more cows,

then he would share in . • • the profits above • • • all
expenses being taken out." (Tr.

571

The final report of the special master attributes
profits from the sale of sheep ($1,104), lambs ($3,0821,
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beef ($552), and fill dirt ($6,174) to the joint venture
in the total amount of $10,992.
master- Civil No.

(Report of special

6169 file, p. 128).

Appellant respectfully urges this Court to hold that
the weight of evidence clearly shows the agreement of the
parties was to share only the profits from the sale of
calves.

Hence, that the profits attributed to the joint

venture from the sale of sheep, lambs, beef, and fill
dirt in the amount of $10,992.00 should be excluded from
the final accounting of the parties.
POINT V.
THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE FINDINGS OF FACT THAT
ALL LOSSES FROM THE OPERATION WERE TO BE ABBOTT'S.
Abbott's testimony on direct examination presents
his understanding of the original joint venture agreement
(Tr.

57-59).

In summary, he testified to ( l ) a $500 draw

against profits by Cby the parties.

This understanding

was reinforced by Abbott's testimony on
cross-examination.

(Tr. 61, 62)

Christensen's testimony on direct examination presents his understanding of the original joint venture
agreement (Tr.

65, 73).

He testified to (1) Abbott's pur-

chase of real property and livestock,
month guarantee, (3)

(2) a $500 per

division of the calf crop after

deduction of expenses, and (4)

an agreement to make a
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future agreement for an interest in the operation.
testimony was reiterated on cross-examination <Tr.

This
75).

As was noted supra, Christensen's wife, Maxine, testified
to the same understanding of the original joint venture
agreement.

(Tr.

339-340>

Upon reading the testimony of the parties, it can be
seen that no understanding was reached regarding the sharing of joint venture losses.

Therefore, absent any other

facts to the contrary, it follows that Finding of Fact #2
regarding,

".

.

. any losses from the operation .

being attributed to Abbott has no factual support.
If the partners did not have an express agreement
relating to the sharing of losses, how should the losses
of the venture be distributed?

This Court has supplied

the answer, stating: "A joint venture should remain joint
whether it results in a gain or a loss, unless the parties otherwise contract."

Producer's Livestock Market-

ing v. Christensen, 588 P. 2d 156, 158 <1978).

In Pro-

ducer's Livestock the parties had engaged in a joint venture similar to the instant case.

Producer's Livestock

put up the capital and the other party, Zane Christensen,
furnished expertise in buying, feeding, managing, and
selling cattle with an oral agreement to share profits.
Ultimately, the venture incurred a loss. This Court determined that in the absence of an agreement to the con-
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trary, losses must be shared by the joint venturers.
Applying the Producer's Livestock logic to the instant
loss, the joint venturers must share jointly in any
losses.
The Abbott and Christensen venture was similar to,
if not in reality, a partnership.

Section 48-1-4(4),

Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, states that
. receipt by a person of a share of the profits of a
business is prima facie evidence that he is a partner in
the business . . . "

By agreement, Abbott and Christensen

shared profits in their joint business.
Under partnership law, when there is no express
agreement regarding the sharing or distribution of
partnership losses, the law states that losses, whether
capital or otherwise, are to be distributed in the same
proportion as profits.
60 Arn Jur 2d 39.

48-1-15(1), Utah Code.Annotated.

While Abbott does not here argue that

the joint business constituted a partnership, Christensen
has repeatedly referred to the joint venture as a partnership.

(E.g., Record-Civil No. 5799 file, pp. 19-23)

The

similarity with a partnership tends to support application of partnership law requiring sharing of losses in
the same proportions as profits.
Appellant respectfully requests this Court rule that
all losses of the joint business should be shared equally
between Abbott and Christensen and that the case be
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remanded to the lower Court with instructions to make
adjustments in accordance with this ruling.

POINT VI.
THE COWS REPLEVIED BY ABBOTT ARE ATTRIBUTABLE TO HIS CAPITAL
CONTRIBUTION AND RIGHTFULLY BELONGED TO ABBOTT UNDER THE
AGREEMENT TERMINATING THE JOINT VENTURE.
In the fall of 1973, the joint venture cows produced
a number of calves that were held back from sale because
calf prices were so low.

(Tr.

86)

The calves remained

the property of the joint venture until it terminated.

By the time the termination occurred, they had matured to
adult cows and had produced calves of their own.

(Tr.

241-242)
Abbott testified that inasmuch as the

~

in the

joint venture were to belong to him, the calves held over
from 1973, now grown into cows, belonged to him.

(Tr. 88)

Further, he testified that Christensen was given credit
for any interest he might claim in the now grown calves
at the termination of the joint venture.

(Tr. 89, 103)

Abbott demanded that Christensen turn-over the subject cows to him a part of the termination settlement. In
response to Christensen's refusal, the cows were replevied by Abbott.

(Tr.

89)

In the special master's report of October 8, 1980,
Christensen is given credit for $9,620.

(Record- Civil
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No.

6169 file, pages 128-130)

This amount represents the

value that the special master placed on the replevied
cows.
Appellant refers the Court to Plaintiff's Exhibit
#81.

This document represents Plaintiffs unrebutted

testimony regarding the relative value of the real property which was divided among the parties upon termination
of the joint venture.

(Tr.

455)

Table I, below, repre-

sents a tabulation of the difference between the cost of
each property and remaining mortgage or contract balance
at the time the joint venture was terminated.

TABLE I
(Property Distributed to Christensen on Termination)
Pro12erty
Birch u
Birch #2
Zane C.
Lindsay
Reary

Cost*
$ 70,000.00
16,000.00
643,000.00
100,000.00
52,000.00

. (Gain)
Difference

Mortgage
Balance*
$ 61,096.00
7,100.00
593,000.00
69,176.00
35,000.00

Total Gain to Christensen

$ 8, 904. 00
8, 900. 00
50,000.00
30,824.00
17,000.00
$115. 628. 00

* figures from Exhibit #81

As can be seen, Christensen's gain on the termination is $115,628.00 based on cost.
(Table II,

Based on market value

infra), the gain is $596,128.00.

-24-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE I I
(Property Distributed to Christensen on Termination)
ProEerty
Birch #1
Birch #2
Zane C.
Lindsay
Reary

Market
Value
$315,500.00
40,000.00
765,000.00
160,000.00
81,000.00

$

Mortgage
Balance*

<Gain)
Difference

61,096.00
7,100.00
593,000.00
69,176.00
35,000.00

$254,404.00
32,900.00
172,000.00
90,824.00
46i000.00

Total Gain to Christensen

~~96 1 128 1 00

•figures from Exhibit #81

It is readily apparent that Christensen has been well
compensated for any interest he claims to have in the cows
which were replevied by Abbott.

Even using Christensen's

"gain" based upon "cost" <$115,628.00l from Table I, and
less the $9,620.00 that the special master calculated,
Christensen had a net gain of ($115,628.00 - $9,620.00)
$106,008.00 from the real property distribution.

Using

Christensen's gain based on market value <$596,128.00l from
Table II, Christensen had a net gain of ($596,128.00 $9,620. 00) $586, 508. 00.
To avoid an inequitable result, appellant urges this
Court to affirm his ownership of the repleived cows and to
hold that Christensen is not entitled to a credit for those
cows.
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POINT VII.
THE AWARD TO CHRISTENSEN FOR CARE OF ABBOTT'S COWS WAS IN
CONTRAVENTION OF THE PARTIES AGREEMENT.
In the special master's report of October 8, 1980,
Christensen is given a credit of $17,785.98 for the care a~
feeding of 185 cows that belonged to Abbott.

The care and

feeding took place in 1975 after termination of the joint
venture between the parties.

The special master's calcula-

tions were based upon figures elicited during the testimony
of respondent's witness, Mr. Johnny Fausett.

(Record- Civil

No. 6169 file, pages 128-130)
Abbott testified that Christensen agreed to care for
and feed the cows as part of the joint venture termination
agreement.

(Tr.

443-444)

In support of this testimony,

Abbott points to the more than generous termination
settlement with Christensen.

In that settlement, Abbott

deeded real property to Christensen with a cost basis in
excess of mortgages of $115,628.00,

(Table I, supra) and a

market value basis in excess of mortgages of $586,508.00.
(Table II, supra)
Both parties agreed that Christensen was to care for
the joint venture cows which were retained by Abbott,
304,443)

Christensen, however, denies that he was to care

for the cows as part of the settlement agreement.
305 l

(Tr.

(Tr. 304,

Christensen testified that he assumed Abbott would pay
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him the same amount ($500.00 per month) that was being paid
during the existence of the joint venture.

(Tr.

258)

One of the duties undertaken by Christensen in caring
for Abbott's cows was their feeding.

Christensen testified

that he fed the cows hay which was produced by the joint venture during 1974.

(Tr.

254)

Abbott testified that as part

of the termination agreement the hay was to belong to him.
He also testified that there was sufficient hay to provide
for the cows during the winter.

(Tr.

426)

Christensen's testimony was that the hay from the 1974
operation was to go to each party on a "prospective basis."
<Tr. 248)

This was in conflict with Abbott's testimony

wherein he stated that "there was no reason to give any of
it away [to Christensen] and then buy some more."

<Tr. 426>

Abbott urges that the Court look to the equity of the
real estate division and the fact that Christensen obtained
a great deal of wealth from a minimal investment as a result
of the termination settlement.

It is entirely reasonable

that Christensen was willing to give up the 1974 hay crop in
exchange for the real property he received on termination of
the joint venture.

POINT VIII.
ALTERNATIVELY, THE AWARD TO CHRISTENSEN FOR CARE OF ABBOTT'S
COWS WAS EXCESSIVE AND UNJUSTIFIED.
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In the alternative, Abbott argues that the special master overcompensated Christensen in calculating the costs of
caring for the cows.

The special master relied upon Johnny

Fausett's testimony in calculating the costs.
Civil No.

(Record-

6169 file, pages 128-129) Mr. Fausett was apparent-

ly in the cattle raising business.

He testified to being

"responsible for 9, 000 head of cattle" during 1975.

(Tr,

123)
Abbott urges that the cost figures testified to by

~.

Fausett and used by the special master do not apply to the
situation in the joint venture.

First, Mr. Fausett was

caring for 9,000 cattle versus the small number of cows
cared for by Christensen.

There is an obvious difference in

the scale of operations including number of employees and
amount of equipment.

Further, Mr. Fausett's figures do not

take into account the fact that Christensen used Abbott's
hay to feed the cows.

(Tr.

261)

If the Court disregards Abbott's contention that
Christensen agreed to care for the cows as part of the settlement, it is inequitable to grant Christensen recovery on
Fausett's figures.

Christensen himself testified to the

fact he assumed he would only be paid $500.00 per month
while he was feeding the cows from the termination of the
venture through May 20th (when the cows would no longer be
on feed).

(Tr.

258,263)

He further testified that he used
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both Abbott's and his own hay [from the Reary Place] and
that no hay was purchased.

(Tr.

261)

By Christensen's own testimony, he calculated three
cows to a bale of hay per day.

(Tr.

254)

He further testi-

fied that he fed Abbott's 185 cows a little over 6,000 bales
of hay.

(Tr.

261,263)

Christensen testified that a bale of

hay was worth $1.50 at the time he cared for Abbott's cows.
(Tr. 263)

Based on these figures, Christensen fed Abbott's

cows (6,000 x $1.50) $9,000.00 worth of "his own" hay.

I-f

Christensen is credited with $500.00 per month from January
through May 20th, when the cows were taken off feed, he
would accrue total monthly "guarantee" charges of $500. 00 x

4 2/3 months= $2,334.00. The total feed costs ($9,000.00l
and the total monthly "guarantee" ($2,334.00l equals
$11,334.00.

This is the greatest amount that could be

allowed based on Christensen's own figures.
However, the Court should take into consideration the
fact that Abbott's own hay was also used in feeding the
cows.

In 1975, May 20th was the 140th day of the year.

If

Christensen fed Abbott's 185 cows for 140 days at one bale
per three cows, it would take 140 days x 185 cows= 25,900/3
cows per bale = 8,633 bales of hay.
Even if Christensen and Abbott had divided the joint
venture hay equally, one-half of the hay fed to Abbott's
cows was his own property and not chargable to him (no hay
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was purchased to feed the cows).
only be credited with 8,633/2

=

Thus, Christensen should
4,316.5 bales of hay.

$1.50 per bale, this equals $6,474. 75 for the hay.

At

Adding

the $2,334.00 total monthly "guarantee" to the $6,474.75 for
the hay, the total credit is equal to $8,808.75.
Abbott urges that if Christensen is to recover anythi~
for the care of Abbott's cows, the amount should not be
based on Johnny Fausett' s testimony.

Rather, that recovery

should be $8,808.75 based upon Christensen's own testimony,
adjusted to give Abbott credit for the use of his own hay.
POINT IX.
UNDER UTAH LAW, CHRISTENSEN IS NOT ENTITLED TO THE 424
SHARES OF FARNSWORTH CANAL IRRIGATION COMPANY STOCK.
Abbott and Christensen are in dispute as to whether the
contract of December 21, 1974 (Plaintiff's Exhibit 14> for
sale of the Reary Place, with Abbott as Seller and Christen·
sen as Buyer, included 424 shares of Farnsworth Canal Irriga·
tion Company stock.

Abbott testified that in personally pre·

paring the contract, he purposely did not include the stock
in the contract for sale of the real property.

(Tr. 393)

When Abbott prepared contracts dividing real property, he
simply copied the original contract of purchase and made
what changes he thought appropriate.
the contracts.

(Tr.

He did this on all of

427-428)
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The trial court in its preliminary findings, at the
completion of trial and presentation of evidence, held that
the contract of sale did not include the stock.

519)

(Tr.

518,

However, after submission of memoranda by counsel for

the parties,
Civil No.

(Record, Civil No.

5800 file, p. 62-80 and

5799 file, p. 139-146) the trial court decided

that "the parties thereto agreed and intended to agree that"
the stock was included in the sale.
file, p.

(Record- Civil No.

5800

83- FF#7l

Abbott submits that Christensen did not overcome the rebuttable presumption that water rights represented by shares

of stock in a corporation do not pass to the grantee as an
appurtenance to the land upon which the water right was
used.

Section 73-1-10, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amend-

ed, has been held to create such a presumption.

Brimm v.

Cache Valley Banking Co., 2 U.2d 93,99, 269 P.2d 859

( 1954).

Hatch v. Adams, 7 U. 2d 73, 75, 318 P. 2d 633

(1957).

The relevant part of that statute reads:

"Water rights, whether evidenced by decrees, by certificates of appropriation, by diligence claims to the
use of surface or underground water or by water users'
claims filed in general determination proceedings,
shall be transferred by deed in substantially the same
manner as real estate, except when they are represented by shares of stock in a corporation, in which case
water shall not be deemed to be appurtenant to the
land ... "
This Court established the standard for overcoming the
presumption when it stated that a grantee must show (ll by
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"clear and convincing evidence" that the water right was
appurtenant and,

12) that "the granter intended to

transf~

the water right with the land, even though no express mention of any water right was made in the deed."

Brirrun,

supra. at 99.
With respect to the first part of that standard,
Christensen attempted to show that the water was appurtenant
to the land through the testimony of Fred Lindsay,
for the Farnsworth Canal Irrigation Company,
Farnsworth).

Secre~ry

!hereinafter

This was undertaken through questioning de-

signed to determine how long the previous owners of the
Reary Place had also owned stock in Farnsworth (Tr. 227)
Insofar as that testimony is concerned, however, this Court
stated:
"We are of the opinion that proof that water
represented by water stock was used on certain
land by the owner of the land during the entire
period of his ownership of the land is not alone
sufficient to rebut the presumption that such
water is not to be deemed apprutenant." Hatch,
supra at 75-76.
Going further in his attempt to show the water should
be deemed appurtenant, Christensen has argued that without
water, the Reary Place is valueless and that no one would
purchase such land without water.

However, Abbott has testi·

fied without rebuttal that during the operation of the joint
venture, the Taylor ranch in the same vicinity was purchased
without water.

(Tr.

39ll

He also testified that i t was his
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intention to transfer the water stock in question to the Taylor ranch after the ditches were repaired.

(Tr.

3 9 2)

Except for Christensen's testimony noted above, the
only evidence relating to the value of the Reary Place without water was Plaintiff's Exhibit 81.
However, Mr. Lindsay did testify to the value of the
water stock at the time the Reary Place was transferred to
Christensen.

He estimated that value at $200.00 per share

based on a sale in 1974.

(Tr.

23ll

This means the total

value of the water stock was $200 x 424 shares

= $84,800.00.

Obviously, the purchase price of $52,660.05 (Plaintiff's Exhibit 14> was not meant to include water stock which had a
value more than one and one-half times greater.
The holding of the trial court that the water rights
represented by the subject water stock was appurtenant to
the land sold to Christensen is contrary to both the law and
the facts.
Regarding Abbott's intention as to the water

stock in

question, Abbott testified that he intentionally did not include the water stock in the contract of sale for the Reary
Place because of the terms of the joint venture termination
agreement.

Abbott's intention was to transfer the Reary

water to the Taylor ranch.

Abbott testified that Christen-

sen was going to transfer part of his own water stock from
the Birch Place to the Reary Place.

(Tr.

391,392)

Christen-
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sen testified that he did,

in fact,

water to the Reary Place.

<Tr.

transfer 50 shares of

274, 275l

In preparing contracts of sale for division of the
joint venture real property, Abbott specifically included
water stock with other parcels of real property which were
transferred to Christensen.

79)

a~

(Plaintiff's Exhibits 26

The fact that water stock was specifically included

within the contracts for the other properties and not ineluded in the contract for the Reary Place further shows
Abbott's intention regarding the transfer of the stock in
question.
In Christensen's memorandum opposing the trial Court's
preliminary decision to disallow his claim for the stock, it
is argued that the sale contract's reference to the Buyer's
obligation to "pay all taxes and assessments"

was indica-

tive of Abbott's intent to include the water stock.

How-

ever, when taken in context, as reproduced below, that
phrase refers to assessments in the nature of taxes, such as
special assessments for improvement districts or similar
purposes.
"TAXES

~~-The parties further mutally agree that the
Seller shall pay all taxes and assessments of any ,
kind and nature up to the time Buyer takes possession
of said premises, which is Now in possession; that
the Buyer shall pay all taxes and assessments the~e
after and for so long as this contract shall remain
in force."
<Plaintiff's Exhibit 14l
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Even if interpreted in the manner urged by Christensen,
the contract of sale and escrow agreement in the instant
case did not go so far as the contract and escrow agreement
in Hatch, supra, where this Court decided in favor of the
grantor's retention of water rights.

In that case, the real

estate contract and the escrow agreement contained the real
property description and a statement "together with all
buildings and improvements thereon and all water rights
appurtenant thereto."

[Emphasis added)

The deciding factor in Hatch, supra seemed to hinge
upon the fact that there were other water rights transferred
with the property.
"If repondent had no other water than the 7 1/2
shares in question so that the reference to
appurtenant water would not ref er to any other
water, there would be presented a different
situation." lat 761
In the instant case, water rights are not mentioned in
the contract except on the second page under the heading:
"Abstract of Title, Warranty Deed, Etc.

The Sellers agree

that they will deposit with this agreement the following
instruments:
Sale."

Warranty Deed, Water Certificate, Bill of

<Plaintiff's Exhibit 141

With the escrow documents is a bill of sale for 30
shares of Farnsworth water.

Abbott testified that this docu-

ment was included in the escrow because Christensen had
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agreed to trade Vera Birch "30 shares of water for 30 share:
in an oil well."

(Tr.

417)

It should also be pointed out that Christensen has
other water available to transfer to the Reary Place.

He

had the following Farnsworth water rights at the time the
joint venture property was divided:
Birch #2,

Birch #1,

351 shares;

35 shares; Lindsay Place, 392 shares; and, Zane

Christensen Place, 1,964 shares.

(Plaintiff's Exhibit 811

The findings of fact entered by the trial court are
inconsistant.

Finding #6 is that the contracts between the

parties dividing their interests in the joint venture real
estate were "fully integrated."
file, p.

83)

(Record, Civil No. 5800

If the contracts were fully integrated, the

court erred in considering parol evidence regarding the
water rights.
413.

State Bank of Lehi v. Woolsey,

565 P.2d

Without the admission of parol evidence on the subject

of water stock, the Court, in considering the contract, the
statutes, and relevant case law, could only come to the conclusion that the water stock was not conveyed to Christensen.
Abbott respectfully urges that this Court find Christen·
sen did not meet the burden imposed upon him to overcome the
presumption created by Section 73-1-10, Utah Code Annotated,
1953, as amended, and that Finding of Fact #7 should be
reversed.
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CONCLUSION
The case was tried to the lower court as an accounting
between joint venturers.

In an accounting, this Court may,

in exercise of its equity powers, review both questions of
law and fact.
On appeal, the appellant is urging the Court to return
the case to the lower court with the following instructions:
(1)

Perform a full accounting in accordance with
the stipulation of the parties, taking into
account:
(a)

the appellant's capital contributions to the
joint venture;

(b)

the distribution of joint venture property
upon termination of the business;

(cl

the appellant's $50,000 down payment on the
Zane Christensen/Peterson Place property;

(dl

the agreement of the parties that respondent
was to share only in profits from sale of
the joint venture calves; and,

(el

losses from the joint venture are to be
shared equally.

(2l

The cows replevied by Abbott belonged to him.

(3)

Christensen should not be given an award for care

of Abbott's cows after termination of the joint venture, in
accordance with the party's termination agreement.

In the
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alternate, Christensen's award should be limited to
$8,808.75, in accordance with his own testimony.
(4)

Abbott is to retain the 424 shares of Farnsworu

Canal Irrigation Company stock.
Abbott,

in support of his argument that the Court

should order a full accounting has cited the stipulation
the parties and Utah statutory and case law.

~

This Court hu

held that in the distribution of assets in a joint venture,
the Uniform Partnership Act (UPAl is controlling.

Under

t~

UPA, capital contributions of the joint venturers are
considered liabilities of the venture.

As such, in

distribution of joint venture assets, they rank ahead of

t~

distribution of profits owed to partners.
The accounting made by the special master did not
include Abbott's capital contributions.

It did, however,

include Christensen's capital contributions.

To not also

include Abbott's capital contributions is inequitable.
Further, Abbott's expenditure of $50,000 as a down
payment on the Zane Christensen/Peterson Place, was made in
furtherance of the joint venture's business.

This was a

capital contribution for which Abbott should be given credit.
In calculating the profits and losses of the joint
venture, the agreement of the parties should be controlling.
The testimony of both Abbott and Christensen showed that
Christensen was to share only in the profit from the sale
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of calves (calculated after deduction of expenses of the
joint venture).

The agreement was silent on the sharing of

losses.
Where an agreement is silent on the sharing of losses
in a joint venture, this Court has ruled that joint venturers
must share the losses.

Further, Christensen's arguments that

the business was a partnership and the similarity of a joint
venture to a partnership support the application of partnership law in this case.

That law requires sharing of losses

in the same proportion as profits when the agreement is
silent on allocation of losses
Abbott has shown the joint venture agreement allowed
for sharing of profits from calve sales only between the
parties.

The cows which were replevied by Abbott belonged to

him under the joint venture agreement and under the
termination agreement.

Abbott should not be forced to pay

for his own property.
In the termination agreement, Christensen received a
more than generous settlement for his interest in the joint
venture.

Abbott testified that, as part of that agreement,

Christensen was to care for Abbott's cows during the winter
and spring of 1975 without extra compensation.

Further, hay

from the joint venture was used to feed the cows.

Abbott

should not be required to pay for the care and feed when it
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was part of the Christensen's duties under the termination
agreement.
In the alternate, Christensen testified that he
expected to receive compensaton of $500 per month in caring
for the cows.

Adding that amount to Christensen's claimed

one-half interest in the joint venture hay, the maximum
amount Christensen should receive for the cow's care is
$8,808.75.
Under Utah statutory and case law, Christensen had

t~

burden of proving that the 424 shares of Farnsworth canal
Irrigation Company stock was appurtenant to the Reary Place
land that Abbott sold to Christensen.

The test under that

burden required him to Ill show by "clear and convincing"

evidence that the water stock was appurtenant to the land and 1
121 show Abbott intended to convey the water stock even

though no express mention of the water stock was made.
A review of the testimony and evidence shows that
Christensen failed to meet the "clear and convincing" part cl
the test.

Further, Abbott's intention not to include the

water stock was well supported by the evidence and his
testimony.
In addition, the lo~er court's finding of fact that
the contracts prepared upon termination of the joint venture
were fully integrated precluded the admission of parol
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evidence to overcome the fact that the water stock was not
included in the sale of the Reary Place to Christensen.
For the reasons stated above, Abbott respectfully
submits that this Court should grant him relief on all issues
raised on this appeal.

Respectfully submitted,

WALLACE D. HURD
Attorney for Appellant
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